Determinism and the Method of Difference by Hofmann, Urs & Baumgartner, Michael
Determinism and the Method of Difference*
Urs HOFMANN and Michael BAUMGARTNER
Received: 01.11.2010
Final Version: 31.01.2011
BIBLID [0495-4548 (2011) 26: 71; pp. 155-176]
ABSTRACT: The first part of this paper reveals a conflict between the core principles of deterministic causation and
the standard method of difference, which is widely seen (and used) as a correct method of causally analyzing
deterministic structures. We show that applying the method of difference to deterministic structures can give
rise to causal inferences that contradict the principles of deterministic causation. The second part then locates
the source of this conflict in an inference rule implemented in the method of difference according to which
factors that can make a difference to investigated effects relative to one particular test setup are to be identified
as causes, provided the causal background of the corresponding setup is homogeneous. The paper ends by
modifying the method of difference in a way that renders it compatible with the principles of deterministic
causation.
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1. Introduction
In contrast to the popularity of methods of causal discovery that implement Bayesian
networks and analyze probabilistic data, the problem of causally interpreting determin-
istic dependencies among factors or variables has received comparably little attention in
recent years.1 On the face of it, this reduced interest in the causal analysis of deterministic
data is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, analyzing deterministic data cannot be
considered a special case of analyzing probabilistic data by means of Bayes-nets meth-
ods, because deterministic dependencies give rise to violations of the so-called faithfulness
assumption which, in one way or another, is presupposed by all Bayes-nets methods
(Spirtes et al. 2000; Pearl 2000; Ramsey et al. 2006; Glymour 2007). In consequence, the
latter are not applicable to deterministic dependencies. Second, probabilities in empirical
data on macroscopic causal processes are commonly seen to be due to mere epistemic
limitations. Ontically, myriads of macroscopic processes are taken to be of deterministic
nature, which, accordingly, constitute a very widespread type of phenomenon.
* We thank Craig Callender, Sebastian Leugger, Alexandre Marcellesi, Fabio Molo, Wolfgang Spohn,
Christian Wüthrich and two anonymous referees of this journal for very helpful comments on earlier
drafts. Moreover, we have profited a lot from discussions at the philosophy of science research
colloquia at the University of California at San Diego and the University of Konstanz. Finally, Michael
Baumgartner is indebted to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for generous support of
this work (project CausaProba).
1 Among the few studies that explicitly focus on the discovery of deterministic dependencies are (Luo
2006), (Glymour 2007), or (Baumgartner 2009).
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Nonetheless, explanations for the little attention deterministic methodologies have
received as of late are not difficult to come by. For one, deterministic dependencies,
notwithstanding their (ontic) prevalence, rarely (phenomenally) manifest themselves
in data. Ordinary causal structures are of such high complexity and so sensitive to
confounding influences that data are seldom homogeneous enough to actually exhibit
deterministic dependencies. Only data that are collected against highly controlled causal
backgrounds, as for instance given in specific laboratory contexts, de facto feature deter-
ministic relations. Furthermore, in homogeneous laboratory contexts causal reasoning
is normally considered to be much less problematic than in contexts with uncontrolled
causal backgrounds. Laboratory contexts permit systematic manipulations of investi-
gated factors which renders it possible to uncover causal structures along the lines
of the well-established method of difference (MoD). Even though, since the times of
Mill (1843), MoD has repeatedly been adapted to modern theories of causation and to
the constraints of modern scientific practice (cf. Ragin 1987, 2000, 2008; May 1999;
Woodward 2003; Baumgartner 2009), the basic idea behind the method has remained
unaltered over the past 160 years. Roughly, MoD determines a factor A to be causally
relevant to a factor E, if a manipulation of A in a first test situation S1 is followed by a
variation ofE, while in a second test situation S2 that lacks a manipulation ofA and that
is causally homogeneous with S1, i.e. that accords with S1 in regard to causes of E not
located on a path from A to E, no variation of E occurs. MoD is generally considered
to be a correct method to uncover deterministic causal structures; that is, if it is applied to
deterministic structures and yields that a factor A is causally relevant to a factor E, this
causal dependency indeed exists. That is, within homogeneous laboratory contexts that
allow for systematic manipulations of deterministic structures a simple rule that induces
reliable causal inferences is usually presumed to be available.
This paper shows that reliably uncovering deterministic structures, even under per-
fectly controlled circumstances, is not as straightforward as it may seem at first sight.
We shall argue that in case of deterministic dependencies that are investigated against
homogeneous causal backgrounds the correctness of the method of difference is far
from obvious. More specifically, the paper exhibits that causal inferences drawn on the
basis of MoD may conflict with fundamental principles that are commonly taken to
characterize deterministic causation, as the principle of determinism (“Same cause, same
effect”), the principle of causality (“No effect without at least one of its causes”), or the
principle of non-redundancy (“Causal structures do not contain redundant elements”).
We are going to present a simple deterministic process such that, when this process is
investigated under ideally homogeneous conditions, MoD yields that a particular factor
A is (part of) a deterministic cause of another factor E, where, in fact, such a depen-
dency violates at least one of the core principles of deterministic causation. Hence, the
claim that MoD is a correct method to uncover deterministic causal structures and the
claim that the principles of determinism, causality, and non-redundancy all hold for such
structures are incompatible.
The second part of the paper then locates the source of this conflict in an inference
rule that has been implemented, more or less explicitly, in all available formulations of
MoD—most prominently in modern interventionist methodologies: if there exists at
least one manipulation of an investigated cause factor A with respect to one particular
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test setup such that this manipulation is followed by a change in the effect E, A is
causally relevant to E, provided that the causal background of the corresponding setup
is homogeneous. We take the incompatibility of available variants of MoD and the
principles of deterministic causation to count against the correctness of this inference
rule. The paper ends by replacing this rule by an alternative one that renders the method
of difference compatible with the principles of deterministic causation.
Section 2 presents the relevant principles of deterministic causation and establishes
their intuitive plausibility. In section 3, we exhibit the details of the method of difference
as it has been conceived in modern studies on causal reasoning. Section 4 then introduces
the conflict between the principles of deterministic causation and inferences induced by
MoD. Finally, section 5 suggests a modification of MoD that resolves the conflict.
2. The Principles of Deterministic Causation
For the purposes of this paper, we do not have to presuppose a full-blown theory of
deterministic causation, rather it suffices to introduce three principles a causal structure
has to satisfy in order to be of deterministic nature. That is, we can confine our discussion
to three necessary conditions of deterministic causation.
To present the details of those principles, some conceptual preliminaries are required.
We are going to focus on causation on type level in this paper. Moreover, for simplicity
we shall only consider causal models that exclusively involve binary variables, which we
call factors for short. A causal analysis must be relativized to a set of examined factors,
which shall be referred to as the factor frame of the analysis. Factors are taken to be
similarity sets of event tokens. They are sets of type identical token events. Whenever a
member of such a similarity set occurs, the corresponding factor is said to be instantiated.
Factors are symbolized by italicized capital letters A, B, C , etc. Factors that are related
in terms of type-level causation are not related in terms of some metaphysically stronger
form of dependence, as logical dependence, supervenience, emergence, mereological
containment or the like, i.e. they are non-causally independent. As absences are often causally
interpreted as well, we take factors to be negatable. The negation of a factorA is written
thus: A. A simply represents the absence of an instance of A. Alternatively, factors can
be seen as binary variables that take the value 1 whenever an event of the corresponding
type occurs and the value 0 whenever no such event occurs.
Ordinarily, deterministic causes are highly complex and one effect type may be
brought about by several alternative causes. Deterministic causes are parts of whole
causing compounds. A compound only becomes causally effective, i.e. actually brings about
its effect, if all of its constituents are co-instantiated, i.e. instantiated spatiotemporally
close-by or coincidently. Coincidently instantiated factors are instantiated in the same
situation.2 Often, not all factors contained in a deterministic cause are known or of
interest in a corresponding context of causal discovery. Compounds shall be symbolized
2 Which spatiotemporal interval determines what counts as one situation is notoriously vague and depends
on the specificity of the causal structure under investigation. We are not going to address this question
here, but are simply going to assume that the structures discussed in this paper are sufficiently well
known that the coincidence relation is properly interpretable. For more details cf. Baumgartner (2008).
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by simple concatenations of factors, with placeholders X , X1, X2 etc. standing for open
sequences of unknown or unmentioned factors, for example ABCX1. If A is part of a
compound which is a deterministic cause of E, A is said to be causally relevant to E. The
set σ of relevance relations holding among the factors contained in a given factor frame
µ (relative to pertinent data) constitutes a causal structure over µ. By a deterministic causal
structure we mean a causal structure that only comprises deterministic dependencies.3
Finally, a factor A is said to be exogenous relative to a structure µ iff no other factors Zi
in µ are causally relevant to A.
Based on this conceptual background, we can now state the relevant principles of
deterministic causation. If a compound X is said to be a deterministic (type-level) cause
of a factor E, what is claimed, among other things, is that coincident instantiations of
the components of X determine E to be instantiated. That is, whenever the factors in
X are instantiated in a situation Si there also is an instance of E in Si. Generalizing this
conditional for whole causal structures yields our first principle:
Determinism (D): If a causal structure σ is deterministic, any two situations Si and Sj
that accord with respect to instantiations of exogenous factors in σ accord with
respect to instantiations of all factors in σ.
Second, causal structures satisfy the principle of causality, according to which effects
do not occur spontaneously, i.e. without at least one of their alternative causes being
instantiated as well. Adapting this principle to deterministic structures yields:4
Causality (C): If a factor E is an effect within a deterministic causal structure σ, E is
not instantiated in a situation Si without at least one of its alternative (complex)
causes in σ being instantiated in Si as well.
And third, deterministic structures do not feature redundancies. To illustrate this
principle of non-redundancy, assume that striking a match, factor S, in combination
with the presence of oxygen,O, and the dryness of the match,D, determines the match
to catch fire, F . It then also holds that the compound SODQ determines F to be
instantiated, where Q stands for any arbitrary factor like singing a song or baptizing an
elephant. However, the deterministic cause of F is not SODQ, but SOD. SODQ has
a proper part, viz. SOD, which alone determines F . Q is redundant. Or suppose we
define a factor A such that A is instantiated if and only if the match is struck or no
oxygen is present: A↔ S ∨O. It then follows that AOD also determines the match to
catch fire, for whenever A occurs in combination with OD, Amust be instantiated by a
struck match and not by the absence of oxygen, because oxygen cannot be both present
and absent in the same situation. Nonetheless, one disjunct in the definiens of A plays
no causal role whatsoever for the lighting of matches. For mere logical reasons, instances
3 Hence, we limit our discussion in this paper to completely deterministic structures, that is, to causal
structures that do not contain both deterministic and indeterministic dependencies. For a treatment
of so-called semi-deterministic structures cf. e.g. (Luo 2006).
4 Often, the principles of determinism and causality are combined to one principle of deterministic
causation in the literature. We furnish them with different labels here for the mere purpose of
facilitated reference later on.
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of O cannot be co-instantiated with instances of OD, hence, they are redundant for the
bringing about ofF . IfSOD is a deterministic cause ofF , it follows, among other things,
that any instances of S, of O, and of D can occur in the same situation and that, if that
is the case, F is instantiated as well. In other words, deterministic causes only comprise
factors all of whose instances are compossible. This constraint is violated byAOD. Finally,
assume that whenever F is instantiated, either SOD is instantiated or the dry match is
exposed to some chemical C while oxygen is present, i.e. F → SOD ∨ COD. Now
let factor G be defined such that G is instantiated if and only if the match is both
struck and exposed to the flammable chemical: G ↔ S ∧ C . It follows that whenever
F is instantiated, so is the disjunction SOD ∨ COD ∨GOD. Yet, analogously to the
redundant Q or the redundant instances of A, GOD makes no difference to F over
and above SOD ∨ COD. GOD is not an additional alternative cause of F , i.e. it is
redundant.
For mere logical reasons it is excluded that Q, a proper subset of A, and GOD are
ever indispensable for the bringing about ofF . Yet, each element of a deterministic causal
structure σ possibly makes a difference to the effects of σ. Deterministic structures do
not contain elements that are dispensable for mere logical reasons.
Non-Redundancy (NR): If a causal structure σ comprising the set ε of effects is of
deterministic nature, σ only involves factors Zi that are indispensable for the
bringing about of the members of ε in at least one possible situation Sm, such that
any instance of Zi is causally effective in Sm.
Combining (NR) with (D) and (C), respectively, has implications that allow for a
convenient formal aggregation of the three principles. According to (D), a compound
X which is a deterministic cause of a factor E is a sufficient condition of E, i.e. X → E.
As to (NR), such a sufficient condition must not contain redundancies. That is, first, it
must not be the case that a proper part α of X is itself sufficient for E, where a proper
part of the conjunction X amounts to a reduction of X by at least one conjunct. Hence,
α → E must be false for all proper parts α of X . If X satisfies that constraint, X is a
minimally sufficient condition of E.5 Second, no component of X must have a subset of
instances that, for logical reasons, cannot be co-instantiated with the other factors in X .
All instances of the components ofX must be compossible. Deterministic causes hence
are minimally sufficient conditions of their effects, such that all of the instances of their
component factors are compossible.
Furthermore, according to (C), the disjunction of all alternative deterministic causes
X1,X2, . . . ,Xn of an effect E constitutes a necessary condition of E, i.e. E → X1 ∨
X2∨· · ·∨Xn. Subject to (NR), such a necessary conditionmust not contain redundancies.
More specifically, it must not be the case that a proper part β of X1 ∨ X2 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn,
i.e. X1 ∨ X2 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn reduced by at least one disjunct, is itself necessary for E.
That is, E → β must be false for all proper parts β of X1 ∨ X2 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn. If
X1 ∨ X2 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn satisfies that constraint, it is a minimally necessary condition of E.
In sum, deterministic causal structures can be represented by a double-conditional of
type (1), where (i) each compound X1,X2, . . . ,Xn is composed of factors all of whose
5 Cf. (Broad 1930; Mackie 1974; Graßhoff and May 2001; Baumgartner 2008).
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instances are compossible, (ii) each compound X1,X2, . . . ,Xn is a minimally sufficient
condition of E, and (iii) X1 ∨ X2 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn is minimally necessary for E.
X1 ∨ X2 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn ⇔ E . (1)
For brevity, we refer to such double-conditionals that satisfy (NR) as minimal theories of
E (cf. Graßhoff and May 2001; Baumgartner 2008).
Deterministic structures can be represented on various levels of specification, i.e. by
various minimal theories. To illustrate, reconsider the structure regulating the lighting of
matches. It can be modeled by this (rather coarse-grained) minimal theory:
SOD ∨ COD ⇔ F . (2)
There also exist more fine-grained descriptions, as can e.g. be attained by specifying
factors involved in (2). For instance, there exist two types ofmatches:matcheswhose head
is made of red phosphorus, and others whose head consists of phosphorus sesquisulfide.
That is, the set of events represented by the factor “striking a match” (S) can be
decomposed into the subset of events of type “striking a red phosphorus match” (S1)
and the subset of events of type “striking a phosphorus sesquisulfide match” (S2).
Decomposing S in this vein yields a more fine-grained minimal theory:
S1OD ∨ S2OD ∨ COD ⇔ F . (3)
While there may be numerous minimal theories that adequately represent a deter-
ministic structure σ, subject to (D), (C), and (NR) it holds that there exists at least one
minimal theory for every σ. Or differently, the principles of deterministic causation
entail:
Existence of a Minimal Theory (MT): If a factor A is part of a deterministic cause
of E, there exists at least one minimal theory Φ such that A is part of at least one
disjunct in the antecedent of Φ, i.e. AX1 ∨ X2 ∨ · · · ∨ Xn ⇔ E. [from (D), (C),
(NR)]
In order to show that the principles of deterministic causation can conflict with infer-
ences drawn on the basis of the method of difference, it must—for obvious reasons—be
guaranteed that there in fact exist deterministic causal structures in nature. That is, we
moreover need the following widely accepted assumption:6
Existence of Deterministic Structures (ED): On macro levels, i.e. on levels above
the quantum domain, there exist causal structures that are ultimately of determin-
istic nature.
6 As is well known, there is an ongoing debate in the literature as to whether, if we choose to adopt
an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics, we are forced to settle for universal macro
indeterminism as well. For a survey of the debate from a neurobiological perspective cf. Weber (2005).
In the literature on causal reasoning, the existence of deterministic structures on macro levels is
uncontroversial (cf. Glymour 2007).
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For each of these deterministic causal structures there exists at least one minimal theory.
If that is not the case for a particular structure, it is not a deterministic causal structure.
Given the existence of deterministic structures, this innocuous presupposition is all we
need for the sequel of the argument developed in this paper.
3. The Method of Difference
The standard method to uncover deterministic structures in controlled experimental
contexts dates back to Mill (1843, vol. I, 455): the method of difference (MoD). The
kernel of MoD has remained unaltered over the past 160 years: by comparison of test
situations that agree in relevant respects except for instantiations of investigated causes
and effects, MoD experimentally reveals causal dependencies. In this section, this basic
methodological approach is made more explicit and precise.
It is virtually a truism of causal reasoning that correlations among instantiations
of two factors A and E—even perfect correlations—are not sufficient for a causal
dependency betweenA andE. Correlations ofA andE can also result fromuncontrolled
variations of common causes of A and E. More generally, systematic covariations of A
andE may either be due to a causal dependency betweenA andE or to the uncontrolled
behavior of so-called confounders, where a confounder is a cause of an investigated effect
that can change the value of that effect independently of the factors in an analyzed frame.
Tailored to the analysis of deterministic structures, the notion of a confounder can be
more precisely defined as follows: A factorO is a confounder of an effect Zn relative to
an analyzed factor frame {Z1, . . . , Zn} iffO is located on a causal path to Zn on which
none of the factors Z1, . . . , Zn−1 are located.
In order to infer causal dependencies from covariations, test situations must be
compared that are uniform with respect to instantiations of confounders. Test situations
that satisfy this constraint are termed causally homogeneous:
Causal Homogeneity (CH): Two test situations Si and Sj that are compared in order
to investigate the causal structure behind the behavior of an effect Zn relative
to the frame {Z1, . . . , Zn} are causally homogeneous iff Si and Sj agree with
respect to instantiations of confounders of Zn relative to {Z1, . . . , Zn}.
Given two causally homogeneous test situations S1 and S2, the method of difference
requires that in S1 the value of at least one of the factors Z1, . . . , Zn−1 is changed by
intervention, while inS2 no such interventions are performed (or vice versa). Intervening
on a factor Z1 amounts to surgically inducing Z1 to change its value—most of all,
interventions on Z1 are not connected to the analyzed effect on a causal path that does
not go through Z1 (cf. Woodward 2003, 98). If the interventions in S1 then turn out to
be accompanied by a change in the value of Zn while no such change occurs in S2, it
follows that the manipulated factors are causally relevant to Zn (or Zn, respectively).
This can be seen by the following reasoning. According to the principle of causality, the
change in the value of Zn in S1 does not occur spontaneously, that is, it must have a
cause. Provided that Zn indeed is an effect of a deterministic structure, the fact that
the value of Zn remains unaltered in S2 implies that no cause of Zn—most of all,
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no uncontrolled confounder of Zn—is instantiated in S2. From this, in combination
with the causal homogeneity of S1 and S2, it follows that no uncontrolled variation
of a confounder of Zn accounts for Zn changing its value in S1. The only remaining
difference that can possibly account for the change of the value of Zn in S1 then are
the intervention-induced changes in S1. Therefore, the manipulated factors are parts of
complex causes of Zn, i.e. they are causally relevant for Zn. This, in general terms, is the
method of difference.
To make things more concrete, let us illustrate causal reasoning based on MoD by
means of the simplest possible test design: suppose we want to investigate whether a
single factor A is causally relevant to an effect E. The investigated factor frame for
our exemplary case, hence, shall be {A,E}. First, we need two test situations S1 and
S2 that are causally homogeneous for E with respect to {A,E}. Since homogeneity
amounts to uniformity of confounders across S1 and S2 and since confounders are
(per definition) not controlled for in our test design, the satisfaction of (CH) by S1 and
S2 can only be ascertained in idealized contexts. In real-life experimental circumstances
homogeneity can merely be rendered more or less plausible, for instance, by means of
randomization or isolation of experimental setups in laboratory environments. As we
are only going to be concerned with idealized discovery contexts in this paper, we shall
simply assume the availability of test situations S1 and S2 that are causally homogeneous
forE with respect to {A,E}. Next, MoD calls for an intervention onA that induces an
instantiation of A in one of the two test situations, i.e. that sets A’s value to 1, while A
is left uninstantiated in the other situation. For simplicity, we stipulate that, throughout
this paper, investigated cause factors are always instantiated in S1 and absent in S2. In
sum, this is the design of the simplest application of MoD. To facilitate later reference,
we refer to this test design as a difference test, or a d-test for short, and to the homogeneous
configuration of background factors as a d-test setup.7
Relative to a pair of situations ￿S1,S2￿ such that A is instantiated in S1 and absent
in S2, an investigated effect factor E can be instantiated and absent in four possible
configurations. If E is instantiated in S1 and absent in S2, the d-test is said to generate
a 1-0-outcome, where “1” symbolizes an instantiation and “0” a non-instantiation of E.
Likewise, a d-test can yield a 0-1-outcome, a 1-1-outcome, or a 0-0-outcome. Each of these
four descriptions of d-test outcomes is complete, i.e. it provides all relevant information
about a corresponding d-test outcome.
Only two of these four possible outcomes are causally interpretable. A 1-0-outcome
induces an inference to the causal relevance of A for E: as E occurs in S1, at least one
cause of E must be instantiated in S1; necessarily, A is part of that (these) cause(s), for
otherwiseE would occur in the homogeneous situationS2 aswell. Based on an analogous
reasoning, an 0-1-outcome entails the causal relevance ofA forE. By contrast, 0-0- and 1-
1-outcomes are not causally interpretable, because they are compatible with incompatible
causal models. A 0-0-outcome could result from the simple causal irrelevance of A.
7 Note that as this test design involves a comparison of two test situations only, it presupposes that
investigated causal structures are encoded in binary terms. Often, more complex test designs for
MoD also require binary encodings, for this allows for a straightforward implementation of Boolean
optimization techniques (cf. Baumgartner 2009).
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However, such an outcome could also be due to the fact that, even though A indeed
is part of a complex cause Xi of E, not all of the other factors in Xi are instantiated
along with A in S1, such that Xi does not become causally effective in S1. Finally, a
1-1-outcome is realized whenever at least one confounder of E with respect to {A,E}
is instantiated in both test situations, irrespective of whether or not A is part of a cause
ofE. In short, outcomes of types 0-0 and 1-1 are compatible both withA being causally
relevant to E and with A not being causally relevant to E.
One consequence of the method of difference deserves separate mention at this
point: according to MoD, one single intervention is sufficient to establish A or A as
cause of E, provided that a corresponding d-test produces an 1-0- or 0-1-outcome.
Woodward (2003, 59) has recently restated (or modally generalized) this consequence—
which is already contained inMill’s original formulations ofMoD—in the following often
cited passage taken from the definitional core of Woodward’s acclaimed interventionist
theory of causation:8
A necessary and sufficient condition forX to be a (type-level) direct cause of Y with respect to a
variable setV is that there be a possible intervention onX that will change Y or the probability
distribution of Y when one holds fixed at some value all other variables Zi inV.
That is, relative to an appropriate test setup it holds that if the effect variable changes
its value after at least one intervention on the investigated cause variable, the latter is
entailed to be a cause of the former according to MoD.
Note that the design of d-tests constitutes the simplest possible application of
the method of difference. MoD allows for uncovering causal structures of arbitrary
complexity. Analyzing more extensive factor frames, however, requires more intricate
test designs. Since we are going to focus on deterministic dependencies between pairs
of factors in the following, we can sidestep more complex test designs here.9 All that
matters for our purposes is that according to MoD a single d-test result of type 1-0
implies the causal relevance of A for E, given the causal homogeneity of corresponding
test situations and given that E is an effect of a deterministic causal structure in the first
place. Hence, in case of simple d-tests the method of difference infers causal relevance
relationships based on the following inference rule:
Difference-making (DM): A factor A is causally relevant to a factor E if there exists
at least one d-test setup δ such that intervening on A with respect to E in one
test situation of type δ generates an 1-0-outcome.
Finally, a caveat must be introduced that will turn out to be relevant in the remainder
of this paper: factors analyzed by means of MoD must be suitable for causal modeling.
Procedures of causal reasoning can only be expected to produce adequate outputs if the
variables that are fed into the procedures satisfy certain conditions. For instance, defining
8 We can confine ourselves toWoodward’s account of direct causation here, because his analysis of indirect
(or contributing) causation introduces no additional elements that would be relevant for our current
purposes. The variable setVWoodward mentions in this passage is what we have been calling the factor
frame in this paper.
9 For more details on uncovering complex causal structures on the basis of MoD cf. Baumgartner (2009).
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a factor B as C ∨ E, i.e. B ↔ C ∨ E, yields dependencies between B and E that we
do not want to interpret causally, even though there exist d-test setups relative to which
intervening on B with respect to E generates a 1-0-outcome. B is not a suitable cause
factor for E, because B represents a disjunctive and gerrymandered property some of
whose instances have no resemblances whatsoever. Moreover, B and E are logically
dependent (which causes and effects are not). Unfortunately, suitability conditions are
commonly not explicitly discussed in the relevant literature—often, discussions of such
conditions are explicitly sidestepped (cf. Spirtes et al. 2000, 21, 91-92). There exist
only a few gradual constraints on the suitability of variables: causally modeled variables
must not be non-causally dependent (cf. sect. 2), they must neither represent gerryman-
dered nor gruelike properties some of whose instances have no resemblances (cf. Lewis
1999; Fodor 1997; Glynn forthcoming), rather they must stand for (imperfectly) natural
properties all of whose instances mutually resemble each other (cf. Lewis 1999), or they
should be salient in a corresponding research context (cf. Halpern and Hitchcock 2010).
Plainly, all of these conditions are vague and only yield suitability by degree. The only
precise thing that can be said about the suitability of variables is that, on pain of circularity
and of trivializing corresponding procedures of causal reasoning, suitability must not be
characterized in causal terms. That is,Amust not only count as a suitable causal variable
with respect to E if A in fact causes E (or vice versa). In sum, every application of
MoD must be preceded by identifying a suitable factor frame consisting of factors that
are reasonably natural and salient relative to the relevant context of causal discovery.
4. The Conflict
In this section we show that causal inferences drawn on the basis of the method of
difference can conflict with the principles of deterministic causation. To this end, we
introduce a very simple electric circuit, i.e. an instance of an electrodynamic causal
structure, that we assume to be one of those deterministic structures claimed to exist by
(ED). Nothing hinges on the electrodynamic nature of our example. All that matters for
our purposes is its particular causal structuring. Thus, should the reader, for whatever
reason, take electrodynamic processes to be irreducibly indeterministic, she may simply
substitute any other deterministic process of the same structuring. Furthermore, we
presume to analyze that electric circuit under idealized conditions in which we have
complete control over all relevant factors. Based on these assumptions, it will turn
out that d-tests conducted on our sample structure induce inferences to deterministic
dependencies that do not satisfy all principles of deterministic causation. Hence, the
presumption that MoD is a correct method of causal discovery and that our electric
circuit is of deterministic nature, on the one hand, and (D), (C), and (NR), on the other,
imply a contradiction.
Our sample circuit is depicted in figure 1. The burning of a light bulb “⊗” is regulated
by two electric subcircuits, one on the left-hand side and one on the right-hand side.
Both subcircuits are powered by a battery “|￿” (b1 and b2, respectively), which shall be
assumed to be fully charged by default in the following. The light is on iff either the left
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Figure 1: An electric circuit.
or the right subcircuit is closed.10 The left circuit is closed iff switch 2 is closed while
switch 1 is closed upwards or switch 3 is closed while switch 1 is closed downwards. The
right circuit is closed iff switch 4 is closed. The structure is assumed to be complete,
that is, there are no other ways to turn the lamp on. Furthermore, it is presumed that
all switches can only be either open or closed. There is no such thing as a half-closed
switch.
As indicated in section 2, causal structures can be analyzed on different levels of
specification, i.e. relative to different factor frames. When it comes to causally analyzing
our electric circuit, differences in the specificity or grain of the analysis turn out to be
of particular importance, as shall be shown in what follows. To begin with, suppose we
choose to analyze the circuit relative to the following factor frame, which we assume to
be suitable for our purposes:
(F1) A1 : switch 1 closed upwards F : battery b1 charged
A2 : switch 1 closed downwards K : battery b2 charged
B : switch 2 closed H : switch 4 closed
C : switch 3 closed E : light on
Can factorsA1 andA2 be said to be causally relevant toE relative toF1? We first answer
this question based on the method of difference. To this end, we need a proper d-test
setup, i.e. homogeneous test situations for E with respect to F1. Within the idealized
laboratory context presumed for our example such a setup is not hard to come by. For
instance, take two situations in which switches 2 and 3 are closed, switch 4 is open, and
both batteries are fully charged. If we now intervene to instantiateA1 orA2, respectively,
in one of the two situations, while, in the other, A1 and A2 are not instantiated, we get
a causally interpretable d-test outcome of type 1-0: E is instantiated in the situation
10 We purposefully choose a causal structure whose effect can be brought about on two independent
causal paths, because in deterministic structures of this complexity causes and effects can be ex-
perimentally distinguished without recourse to external asymmetries as the direction of time (cf.
Baumgartner 2008).
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in which A1 or A2 are manipulated and not instantiated in the other test situation.
According to (DM), this outcome induces an inference to the causal relevance of A1
and A2 for E.
Provided that electric circuits are deterministic structures, the method of difference
hence yields that A1 and A2 are each part of a deterministic cause of E. Subject to the
principles of deterministic causation, it thus follows that A1 and A2 are contained in
a minimal theory of E. In light of the dependencies among the elements of the circuit
specified above, this minimal theory is easily stated:
A1BF ∨A2CF ∨KH ⇔ E . (4)
All of the three disjuncts on the left-hand side of (4) are minimally sufficient for E,
the instances of their components are compossible, and the disjunction as a whole is
minimally necessary. The lamp is turned on if and only if at least one of the compounds
A1BF orA2CF orKH is instantiated. That is, relative to the level of analysis adopted
in F1, the electric circuit of figure 1 can be modeled as a deterministic causal structure
which can be straightforwardly uncovered by the method of difference—at least within
our ideal discovery context.
Matters are different if we choose to analyze the circuit relative to the more coarse-
grained frame
(F2) A : switch 1 closed C : switch 3 closed K : battery b2 charged
B : switch 2 closed F : battery b1 charged H : switch 4 closed
E : light on
F2 differs from F1 only insofar as the behavior of switch 1 is represented by one factor
A inF2, whereas inF1 A is decomposed into two factorsA1 andA2.A does not repre-
sent a gruelike or gerrymandered property but a reasonably natural one, which is salient
relative to our context of causal discovery. Even though the instances of A are divisible
into different subsets (switch 1 closed upwards/downwards/before midnight/after mid-
night/forcefully/slowly. . . ) the elements of all of those subsets resemble each other in
relevant respects: they are all closures of switch 1. Moreover, we have already shown that
decomposing A into A1 and A2 yields two parts of deterministic causes of E. That is,
given thatF1 is a suitable factor frame for our purposes, so isF2. Let us thus investigate
whether the method of difference also yields that A is causally relevant to E. To answer
this, homogeneous test situations forE with respect to F2 are required. The same setup
of the circuit which satisfies (CH) forE with respect toF1 also satisfies (CH) forE with
respect to F2: switches 2 and 3 are closed, switch 4 is open, and both batteries are fully
charged. Instantiating A in one situation of this type while suppressing A in another
such situation yields a d-test outcome that is causally interpretable: E co-varies with
the manipulation of A. Hence, there exists an intervention that wiggles the investigated
cause variable such that the investigated effect variable wiggles along. As to (DM), this
1-0-outcome induces an inference to the causal relevance of A to E.
Given our sample circuit is deterministically structured, this finding entails that not
only A1 and A2 are parts of a deterministic cause of E but also A. This, in turn, implies
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that there exists a minimal theory of E containing A. Let us try to state that theory. As
a first attempt one might simply substitute A1 and A2 in (4) by A:
ABF ∨ACF ∨KH ⇔ E . (5)
It can easily be seen, however, that (5) is not a minimal theory, because neither ABF
nor ACF are sufficient for E. For instance, in a constellation in which switches 3
and 4 are open, switch 2 is closed, the batteries are charged, and switch 1 is closed
downwards, ABF is instantiated, yet the lamp does not burn, i.e. E is not instantiated.
Analogously, closing switch 3, opening switches 2 and 4, and closing switch 1 upwards
yields a constellation in which ACF is instantiated along with E. ABF and ACF ,
hence, are not deterministic causes of E. (5) is not an adequate reproduction of the
causal structure regulating the behavior ofE, for it violates the principle of determinism
(D).
Closing switch 1 and only requiring one of the switches 2 and 3 to be closed as
well, does not determine the lamp to burn. This suggests that A might be part of a
deterministic cause of E which comprises both B and C . Thus, another candidate
minimal theory of E containing A would be (6):
ABCF ∨KH ⇔ E . (6)
The compound ABCF indeed is sufficient and even minimally sufficient for E,
because—as we have seen above—neither ABF nor ACF are sufficient for E and
without a fully charged battery b1 (F ) the lamp obviously cannot burn. Nonetheless,
(6) is not a minimal theory of E either, for there are scenarios in which neither ABCF
nor KH are instantiated even though the light is on. Hence, ABCF ∨ KH is not
necessary forE, which shows that (6) violates the principle of causality (C). To illustrate,
suppose switch 4 is open, switches 1 and 2 are closed, switch 3 is open, and battery b1
is charged. If switch 1 happens to be closed upwards in this setup, the lamp burns while
neither ABCF nor KH are instantiated, because C and H are not instantiated—call
this scenario S . As the lamp does not burn spontaneously in S , there must be a cause of
this instance ofE in its spatiotemporal neighborhood. Relative to the idealized design of
our example, we can presuppose complete knowledge about the causal structure behind
the circuit and can thus easily account for the instance of E in S . In S the light is
on because switches 1 and 2 are closed (upwards). Additionally closing switch 3 is not
necessary. Nonetheless, as we have seen above, ABCF is minimally sufficient for E,
because A can be instantiated by closing switch 1 either upwards or downwards. In the
first case, an instance ofB is required to turn the light on, in the second case there must
be an instance of C .
Contrary to F1, the analytic inventory provided by the frame F2 is not fine-grained
enough to adequately model the cause that is responsible for E in S . F2 does not
allow for complementing (6) by missing alternative causes of E in accordance with the
principles of deterministic causation. On the level of specification given byF2 there does
not exist a minimal theory which represents the deterministic causal structure behind
the circuit of figure 1. More specifically, there does not exist a minimal theory of E with
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respect to the frame F2 comprising A. Nonetheless, as we have shown above, MoD
identifies A as being part of a deterministic cause of E.
The principles of deterministic causation do not require that deterministic structures
can be modeled relative to one particular factor frame. The fact that A is determined
to be causally relevant to E on the basis of MoD merely implies that there exists at
least one frame—containingA, of course—which allows for stating a minimal theory of
E containing A (cf. MT above). The pertaining minimal theory, however, must not be
stated on the basis of the conceptual inventory provided by F2. Rather, the latter can
be expanded by introducing other factors that enable a more fine-grained description
of our exemplary circuit. The question thus arises as to how to expand F2 such that A
can be shown to be part of a deterministic structure causing E which—unlike (5) and
(6)—accords with the principles of deterministic causation.
The reason why we have not yet succeeded in reproducing the structure behind the
circuit in figure 1 in a way that complies with (D), (C), and (NR) and that features A as
a part of a cause of E is at hand: closing switch 1 can cause the lamp to burn along two
different causal paths andF2 does not allow for specifying the path which is activated by
a particular instance ofA. The strategy to remedy this deficiency suggests itself. We need
to introduce variables that specify whether switch 1 is flipped upwards or downwards.
Hence, let us introduce the following two factors:
D1 : switch 1 flipped upwards D2 : switch 1 flipped downwards
Introducing D1 and D2 into F2 yields frame F3: F3 = F2 ∪ {D1, D2}. F3 enables
us to further specify the complex cause A could be part of by conjunctively adding D1
and D2, respectively, to pertaining compounds. Plainly, adding either D1 or D2 to the
compound ABCF contained in (6) will not yield a minimally sufficient condition of
E. Our electric circuit is structured in such a way that, if switch 1 is closed upwards,
the position of switch 3 is rendered irrelevant, and analogously if switch 1 is closed
downwards, switch 2 is of no relevance any longer. Hence, complementing (6) by D1
and D2 would yield a model of the circuit that inevitably features redundancies and,
thus, violates (NR). In contrast, introducingD1 andD2 into (5), on the face of it, seems
to yield just the specification of our model that accords with (D), (C), and (NR):
AD1BF ∨AD2CF ∨KH ⇔ E . (7)
Does (7) indeed amount to a minimal theory of E? Clearly, an instance of E occurs
if and only if either AD1BF or AD2CF or KH are instantiated. Thus, (7) features
both sufficient and necessary conditions of E, i.e. it accords with (D) and (C). Yet, are
these conditions free of redundancies, i.e. does (7) also accord with (NR)? That the
answer to that question must be in the negative, as both AD1BF and AD2CF involve
redundancies, can be seen by the following reasoning. In virtue of the structuring of
the electric circuit it holds that whenever switch 1 is flipped upwards or downwards,
it is closed. That means the set of instances of D1 and of D2 are proper subsets of
the set of instances of A, i.e. D1 → A and D2 → A. In consequence, both AD1BF
and AD2CF contain proper parts that are sufficient for E, viz. D1BF and D2CF .
Flipping switch 1 upwards (downwards) and closing switch 2 (switch 3) while battery b1
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is charged determines the light to be on. Additionally requiring switch 1 to be closed is
redundant. That is, introducing D1 and D2 into (5) does not result in a minimal theory
of E containing A, but renders A redundant and, thus, violates (NR). Contrary to first
appearances, (7) is not a minimal theory ofE either. In sum, whileF2 is not fine-grained
enough to model the circuit in accordance with (C), F3 is too fine-grained to model it in
such a way that A has a non-redundant causal function in accordance with (NR). Thus,
a factor frame relative to which A can be said to be causally relevant to E in accordance
with all principles of deterministic causation must be somewhat more specific than F2
and somewhat less specific than F3.
Such as not to render A redundant, additional factors introduced into F2 must be
less specific than D1 and D2. Candidates are not hard to come by:
D3 : something flipped upwards D4 : something flipped downwards
Introducing D3 and D4 into F2 results in the frame F4: F4 = F2 ∪ {D3, D4}. In
contrast to D1 and D2, D3 and D4 can be instantiated by other things than switch 1.
Relative to the design of our exemplary circuit, D3 can also be instantiated by switch
2 and D4 by switches 3 or 4. This guarantees that the sets of instances of D3 and D4
are not proper subsets of the instances of A, which, in turn, guarantees that A is not
rendered redundant by admitting D3 and D4. These considerations furnish a further
candidate model of the structure regulating the behavior of E:
AD3BF ∨AD4CF ∨KH ⇔ E . (8)
Is (8) a minimal theory of E? Again, that is not the case. Analogously to (4), (8) does
not accord with (D), for neitherAD3BF nor AD4CF are sufficient for E. To see this,
consider a scenario in which switch 2 is closed (upwards), switch 1 is closed downwards,
switches 3 and 4 are open, and the batteries are fully charged. In such a scenario, the
compoundAD3BF is instantiated, yet the lamp does not burn. Furthermore, if switch 3
is closed (downwards), switch 1 is closed upwards, switches 2 and 4 are open, and the
batteries are fully charged, AD4CF is instantiated, yet no instance of E occurs. Hence,
neither AD3BF nor AD4CF are deterministic causes of E. The electric circuit of
figure 1 is structured in such a way that it is of crucial importance that switch 1, and not
something else, is flipped upwards when switch 2 is closed and the battery is charged.
Similarly, it is switch 1 which must be switched downwards, and not something else,
in cases when switch 3 is closed and the battery charged. However, frame F4—just as
F2—is too coarse-grained to allow for an adequate reproduction of these dependencies.
We still have not found a factor frame containingA relative to whichA could indeed
be said to be part of a deterministic cause of E. In order to state a minimal theory of E
comprisingA we need a frame which is somewhat more specific than F4 and somewhat
less specific than F3. We are looking for additional factors that can only be instantiated
by switch 1, yet whose instances are not completely contained in the set of instances of
A. As a final attempt, let us investigate whether a disjunctive coarse-graining ofD1 and
D2 might do the job:
D5 : switch 1 flipped upwards or D6 : switch 1 flipped downwards or
switch 1 left open switch 1 left open
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The frame that results from introducing D5 and D6 into F2 will be referred to as F5:
F5 = F2 ∪ {D5, D6}. As not all instances of D5 and D6 are also instances of A,
introducing these factors into (5) does not render A redundant:
AD5BF ∨AD6CF ∨KH ⇔ E . (9)
It may justifiably be doubted that D5 and D6 meet the suitability standards introduced
at the end of section 3, for their instances fall into two subsets whose elements seem to
lack resemblance. By contrast,D5 is equivalent toD2 andD6 toD1. Since we took both
D1 and D2 to be suitable for causal modeling, let us, for the sake of the argument, also
accept the suitability of D5 and D6. Hence, does (9) not only assign a non-redundant
function to A, but moreover satisfy the other constraints imposed on minimal theories?
As can easily be seen from the definitions of D5 and D6, that again is not the case.
Both D5 and D6 have proper subsets of instances that, for logical reasons, cannot be
co-instantiated withA. Whenever switch 1 is open, bothD5 andD6 are instantiated, yet
these instances ofD5 andD6 are not compossible with A. For mere logical reasons, all
of these instances ofD5 andD6 cannot ever be causally effective in turning the lamp on,
i.e. they are redundant. One disjunct in the definiens of D5 and D6, viz. leaving switch
1 open, is not only irrelevant for E, but moreover causally relevant for E. That is, (9)
violates (NR). It is not a minimal theory of E.
All of our attempts at specifying the initial frameF2 in order to find aminimal theory
of E containing A have missed the mark. While (7) and (9) introduce redundancies, (8)
does not satisfy the principle of determinism. Of course, this does not conclusively prove
that there does not exist a minimal theory of E containing A. Negative existentials that
are not formal truths cannot normally be conclusively proven. Nonetheless, we presume
to have exhausted the realm of possible expansions of F2. F3 is too fine-grained, as
it renders A redundant. We have tried to coarse-grain F3 both by means of existential
(F4) and disjunctive (F5) generalization, none of which has been successful. There does
not exist a minimal theory that would feature A as part of a deterministic cause of
E. From this it follows that A cannot be said to be part of a deterministic cause of
E in accordance with all the principles of deterministic causation, notwithstanding the
fact that MoD identifies the closure of switch 1 as part of a deterministic cause of the
light being on. The claim that MoD is a correct method of uncovering deterministic
structures, the claim that our sample circuit is of deterministic nature, and the claim that
deterministic structures are regulated by the principles of determinism, causality, and
non-redundancy are not compatible.
5. Resolving the Conflict
What are we to conclude from this contradictory finding? A possible conclusion would
be that the causal structure regulating the behavior of our circuit is not of deterministic
nature after all. In consequence, (D), (C), and (NR) do not apply to the circuit, which, in
turn, prevents the conflict between MoD and the principles of deterministic causation
from arising in the first place. However, as our findings in section 4 in noway hinge on the
specific (electrodynamic) nature of our example, successfully resolving the conflict along
Theoria 71 (2011): 155-176
Determinism and the Method of Difference 171
these lines would also require that it be shown that no other deterministic structure with
the same causal ‘switching’ pattern can be substituted for our circuit. Every structure with
the same form as our circuit would have to be claimed to be of irreducibly indeterministic
nature. Drawing such a far-reaching consequence is clearly uncalled for on the mere basis
of an a priori philosophical argument as the one presented in the previous section.
Alternatively, it could be held that deterministic structures, contrary to first ap-
pearances, do not satisfy all of the principles of deterministic causation put forward in
section 2. As a consequence, one would have to postulate that there are deterministic
causes that do not determine their effects, or effects of deterministic structures that
occur without any of their causes, or causal structures that contain elements that cannot
possibly make a difference to the effects contained in pertaining structures. Any of
these consequences, in our view, would amount to a straight-out contradiction in terms.
Rejecting any of the principles of deterministic causation and still speak of deterministic
causal structures is not a viable option.
It might also be argued that the conflict stems from the fact thatA, after all, violates
the suitability caveat introduced at the end of section 3. Even though “switch 1 closed”
does neither represent a gruelike nor a gerrymandered property, A could be rejected
as a variable that is suitable for modeling the causes of E, because A is an ambiguous
manipulation variable in the sense of Spirtes and Scheines (2004), and ambiguous manip-
ulation variables might be declared unsuitable for causal modeling. Spirtes and Scheines
introduce their notion of an ambiguous manipulation with a hypothetical example (834):
(. . . ) there are two sorts of cholesterol: LDL cholesterol causes heart disease, andHDL cholesterol
prevents heart disease. Low-cholesterol diets differ, in the proportions of the two kinds of
cholesterol. Consequently, experiments with low-cholesterol regimens can differ considerably in
their outcomes. In such a case the variable identified as causal—total cholesterol—is actually
a deterministic function of two underlying factors, one of which is actually causal, the other
preventative. The manipulations (diets) are actually manipulations on the underlying factors, but
in different proportions. When specification of the value of a variable, such as total cholesterol,
underdetermines the values of underlying causal variables, such as LDL cholesterol and HDL
cholesterol, we will say that manipulation of that variable is ambiguous.
Hence, could the conflict betweenMoD and the principles of deterministic causation
be resolved by stipulating thatMoD is only applicable to factor frames that do not feature
ambiguous manipulation variables—which requirement is violated by F2? First, it must
be noted that coarse-grained variables (e.g. variables representing supervening properties)
commonly underdetermine the values of underlying fine-grained variables (representing
corresponding supervenience bases). That is, manipulations of coarse-grained variables
generally tend to be ambiguous in the sense of Spirtes and Scheines (2004). Accordingly,
restricting the applicability of MoD to ambiguity-free factor frames would restrict that
applicability to factor frames without coarse-graining. Such a sweeping restriction is
certainly not called for, because as long as the underlying variables of an ambiguous
manipulation variableM do not have opposite effects, the overall causal influence ofM on
an investigated effect variable is still determinate—and should hence be uncoverable by
a proper procedure of causal inference (cf. Spirtes and Scheines 2004, 844). By contrast,
if underlying variables have opposite effects, as in the cholesterol example, the overall
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effect ofM is inevitably indeterminate. However, restricting the application of MoD to
factor frames that do not feature ambiguous manipulation variables of this problematic
type does not resolve the conflict of the previous section, forA1 andA2—the two fine-
grained constituents of A—do not have opposite effects on E. A is not an ambiguous
manipulation variable of the problematic type.
Moreover, restricting the applicability of methods of causal discovery to factor
frames that do not feature ambiguous manipulation variables with opposite effects
would amount to determining the suitability of variables for causal modeling based on
causal conditions. Yet, whether or not these conditions are satisfied may not be assessable
in contexts of causal discovery. In the example of the previous section, we applied MoD
to determine whether A1, A2, and A are positively or negatively relevant to E. Hence,
knowledge of the causal dependencies amongA,A1,A2, andE cannot be presupposed
when assessing the suitability of corresponding factor frames. The suitability of factor
frames for causal modeling must be determined in non-causal terms. A method of causal
reasoning must not be induced to draw incorrect causal inferences in cases of ambiguous
manipulation variables, rather, it must be able to detect whether analyzed factor frames
feature ambiguities of the problematic kind or not.
Section 4 has shown that MoD does not meet that benchmark. MoD erroneously
identifiesA as part of a deterministic cause ofE. Thus, the only remaining consequence
to draw from the conflict between MoD and the principles of deterministic causation
is that available variants of the method of difference can give rise to incorrect causal
inferences. Both closing switch 1 upwards and closing it downwards are (positively)
causally relevant for the light to be on, but the closure of switch 1 simpliciter is not—
even though the latter is nothing but the union of the former. There are two independent
causal routes from switch 1 to the lamp. Different variables that are independent of the
closure of switch 1 are involved in these routes. Causally relevant factors in deterministic
structures, however, are not connected to their effects via multiple routes that are
influenced by factors that are not controlled by (i.e. that are not effects of) those causally
relevant factors. In contrast, if A were connected to E on routes that do not differ in
relevant respects, A could easily be identified as part of a deterministic cause of E. For
instance, if it were not possible to interrupt the upper and lower connections between
switch 1 and the lamp by virtue of switches 2 and 3, a minimal theory of E containing
A could easily be stated: AF ∨KH ⇔ E. In the circuit of figure 1, however, switches
2 and 3 override the causal relevance of the closure of switch 1 simpliciter to the light
being on. Due to switches 2 and 3 there does not exist a deterministic cause of E for
which A would play a non-redundant role.
That means a single intervention on a suitable cause variable A, even in ideally
homogeneous circumstances, that is followed by a change in the value of an investigated
effect variableE is not sufficient to establish the causal relevance ofA toE. Accordingly,
the inference rule (DM) implemented in traditional formulations of the method of
difference is not correct. A single 1-0-outcome does not even in perfectly homogenous
d-test setups entail causal relevance. This is the proper consequence to draw from the
conflict between MoD and the principles of deterministic causation.
This finding, of course, raises the follow-up question as to how the method of dif-
ference is to be amended such that all of its inferences are compatible with the principles
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of deterministic causation. If one intervention on a proper d-test setup generating a
1-0-outcome is not enough to unfold causal relevancies, what else is required? In order
to answer that question, let us reconsider our electric circuit. If both switches 2 and 3
are open or if switch 4 is closed, all interventions on switch 1 yield outcomes of type
1-1 or 0-0, which are not causally interpretable. There are three setups of the circuit that
provide homogeneous test situations for E relative to which an intervention on A can
generate causally interpretable outcomes:
Setup δ1: Switch 2 is closed, switches 3 and 4 are open, battery b1 is charged.
Setup δ2: Switch 3 is closed, switches 2 and 4 are open, battery b1 is charged.
Setup δ3: Switches 2 and 3 are closed, switch 4 is open, battery b1 is charged.
Setups δ1 and δ2 are of particular interest for our purposes. For instance, if A is
manipulated by closing switch 1 in a situation of type δ1, the lamp only burns if A
happens to be instantiated by closing switch 1 upwards. If the manner of intervening on
A, i.e. of closing switch 1, is varied in another test situation of type δ1 such that switch 1
is now closed downwards, the lamp does not burn, in spite of no other variable having
changed its value. That is, in situations of type δ1, the closure of switch 1 is sometimes
followed by the light being on and sometimes not—and analogously for situations
of type δ2. In other words, upon equal instantiations of potential cause variables, the
investigated effect sometimes occurs and sometimes it does not. Clearly, inferring that
A is a cause of E based on such test results would induce a violation of the principle
of determinism, which, as indicated above, we do not want for processes of the type
under consideration. That A is not part of a deterministic cause of E, however, is not
revealed if causal inferences are based on singular interventions on A in d-test setups
in which switch 1 is closed upwards. Only systematically varying the manner of manipulating
A in test situations of type δ1 and δ2 exhibits that A cannot in fact be interpreted as
part of a deterministic cause of E. Varying the manner of manipulating A amounts to
varying the causes of A used as interventions on A with respect to E. Merely using one
particular cause ofA as intervention onA does not induce reliable causal inferences, even
in ideally homogeneous laboratory contexts. Reliable causal inferences with respect to
deterministic structures are only to be had, if the manner of intervening on investigated
cause variables is systematically varied and the outcome of such test iterations remains
stable across these variations.11
Further qualifications are required, though. Consider a situation in which our electric
circuit is set in δ3. All possible variations of intervening on A in such a situation will
be accompanied by a change in the value of E. Switch 1 can either be closed upwards
or downwards. If switches 2 and 3 are closed, closing switch 1 in either way generates
stable 1-0-outcomes, for the lamp burns in both cases. That is, stability of test outcomes
across variations of intervening onAmust not only be attained relative to one particular
d-test setup but relative to all setups that can generate causally interpretable outcomes,
i.e. relative to all of δ1, δ2, and δ3. More generally put, the inference rule for d-tests
11 As Woodward (2003, ch. 6) shows, interventions must not be varied arbitrarily, but only within some
range of variability that is suitable for a pertaining process. We tacitly assume here that interventions
are only varied within such a range; for instance, switch 1 must not be shattered with a hammer.
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implemented in the method of difference (DM) must be amended along the following
lines:
Stable difference-making (SDM): A factor A is causally relevant to a factor E if
there exists a d-test setup δ such that intervening on A with respect to E in one
test situation of type δ generates an 1-0-outcome, and for all d-test setups δ￿ for
which there exists a possible intervention I on A with respect to E generating an
1-0-outcome there does not exist an intervention I ￿ on A with respect to E not
generating an 1-0-outcome.
It is plain that (SDM) is only conclusively applicable under idealized conditions to the
effect that complete control over all relevant factors is on hand. Only then is it possible
to assess whether there in fact does not exist an intervention I ￿ on A with respect to E
not generating an 1-0-outcome. Without ideal isolability of an analyzed process the truth
value of such a negative existential cannot be determined in a finite number of steps. In
real experimental contexts, (SDM) is only applicable inductively. That is, an experimenter
will vary the manner of intervening on a tested factor A to a certain finite degree, which
he takes to be representative for the causal structure under investigation. If the tested
factor stably makes a difference to the investigated effect across a significant number of
variations, the result will be inductively generalized such that (SDM) is applicable and
gives rise to a causal inference.
That difference-making should be stable across a significant amount of varied ma-
nipulations in order to infer that two factors are causally related is not a new idea.
Woodward (2003, ch. 6), for instance, has emphatically stressed the importance of stable
or invariant difference-making, especially for deciding among rival causal explanations.12
The requirement of stable difference-making, however, has commonly been seen as a
heuristic means to uncover causal dependencies under non-ideal epistemic conditions
where unknown and uncontrolled factors tend to confound test results. Producing sta-
ble results across systematically varied interventions within uncontrolled backgrounds
significantly raises the probability that pertaining backgrounds are homogeneous, which,
in turn, enhances the reliability of corresponding causal inferences. Yet, the standard
opinion in the literature, from Mill to Woodward, has been that under homogeneous
experimental conditions, i.e. when possible confounders of an investigated deterministic
structure are controlled, a single positive d-test result is sufficient for a causal inference.
We take the conflict between MoD-guided causal reasoning and the principles of
deterministic causation revealed in section 4 to show that the single-intervention con-
jecture has been too optimistic. Even under ideal circumstances, single interventions
generating a d-test outcome to the effect that a change in a factor A is followed by a
change in a factorE can, at best, be seen to entail thatA or an element of one of its many
decompositions A1, A2, . . . , An, where A↔ A1 ∨A2 ∨ · · · ∨An, is causally relevant
to E. Single interventions, however, are under no circumstances sufficient to establish
the relevance of A to E. The fact that difference-making must be stable in order for it
12 Also, Spirtes and Scheines (2004) suggest that in order to reliably estimate the effects of interventions
on causal structures, those effects must be stable.
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to reliably shed light on causal relationships only partly stems from epistemic or experi-
mental limitations resulting in hampered controllability of causal backgrounds. Varying
d-test setups and manipulations of investigated cause variables, first and foremost, serves
the purpose of finding the adequate level of analysis, i.e. of determining whether A or
its decomposition or both are causally relevant. Causal structures cannot adequately be
modeled on any arbitrary level of specification. Section 4 has shown that the grain of
the analysis is crucial for correct causal inferences, in particular, and successful causal
modeling, in general. In order to find the proper level of analysis, systematic variations of
test setups and manipulations are essential, independently of how well the investigated
structure is known or controlled.
6. Conclusion
The first part of this paper has shown that applying traditional versions of the method
of difference to deterministic causal structures—as simple electric circuits—may yield
causal inferences that contradict fundamental principles of deterministic causation. The
second part has located the source of this conflict in an inference rule that has, more or
less explicitly, been implemented in all available formulations of the method of differ-
ence: single d-tests generating a 1-0-outcome are sufficient to reveal causal relevancies,
provided that pertaining causal backgrounds are homogeneous. We have argued that
even complete control over the factors involved in an investigated causal structure does
not pave the way for a straightforward inference rule which would uncover deterministic
structures based on a handful of successful experimental manipulations. One of the
primary tasks that must be fulfilled on the way to an adequate causal model is to find a
proper level of analysis. Not any level is suited to model a causal process in terms of a de-
terministic structure. Stability of test results across systematic variations of experimental
manipulations not only increases the probability of homogeneous causal backgrounds in
contexts of limited control, but is also required for identifying adequate levels of analysis
in contexts of perfect control.
Apart from refining the inference rule connecting difference-making to causal de-
pendencies, this paper has shown that reliably uncovering deterministic causal structures
is considerably more intricate than it is often taken to be in the literature—laboratory
circumstances notwithstanding. It is time that the causal analysis of deterministic data
receives an amount of attention by the interested community that matches the gravity
of the problems that come with it.
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